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Abstract. Many studies show that time preference data from experiments and surveys
are related to field behavior. Time preference measures in these studies typically depend
simultaneously on utility curvature, the level of impatience, and the change in the level
of impatience. Thus, these studies do not allow one to establish which of these three
components drive(s) the field behavior of interest. Of these components, the change in the
level of impatience is theoretically thought to be the main driver of time inconsistencies
and self-control problems. To test this theoretical presumption, one has to measure the
change in the level of impatience independently from utilities and levels of impatience.
This paper introduces a measure of the degree of decreasing impatience, the DI-index.
It measures the change of impatience independently from the level of impatience and
independently from utility. It can also be used to test various discounting models. An
experiment finds no correlation between the degree of decreasing impatience and self-
reported self-control problems in daily life, suggesting that changing impatience is not the
sole driver of self-control problems.
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1. Introduction
Virtually any decision we make involves future conse-
quences. Individuals are often inconsistent when mak-
ing such decisions. They tend to make plans for the
future to which they do not adhere. Such time incon-
sistencies are revealed by the fact that many procrasti-
nate when starting a diet, going to the gym, and sav-
ing. These inconsistencies can impose large costs on
society if people, for instance, become obese or do not
save enough for their pensions. Understanding time-
inconsistent behavior is important to preventing such
costs. This paper proposes a measure of decreasing
impatience that can be used to determinewhich groups
in society are most prone to time-inconsistent behavior
resulting from decreasing impatience. It can be used
to analyze whether individual differences in decreas-
ing impatience can predict individual differences in
time-inconsistent behavior. Policy makers could use
this knowledge to target specific groups with well-
designed policies to reduce the costly consequences of
inconsistent behavior.
Many studies have shown that experimental and sur-
vey data on time preferences can predict field behav-
ior (e.g., Sutter et al. 2013). Most of them analyze
the association between levels of impatience and field
behavior. Yet, there are at least two independent com-
ponents that determine time preferences: impatience
levels and impatience changes. A high level of impa-
tience implies that one will postpone an unpleasant
task once, but not necessarily that one will repeatedly
postpone this task. Changes in impatience levels can
induce repeated postponement of tasks. Thus, theoreti-
cally, changes of impatience, rather than levels of impa-
tience, drive time-inconsistent behavior. Despite this
theoretical distinction between levels and changes of
impatience, there is not much empirical evidence that
disentangles their effects on field behavior.
Among the very few studies that aim to disentan-
gle the effects of levels and changes of impatience
on field behavior are Meier and Sprenger (2010),
Tanaka et al. (2010), Burks et al. (2009 and 2012), and
Courtemanche et al. (2015). These studies estimated
parameters of hyperbolic discount functions assuming
linear utility. Yet, as this paper will show, none of the
parameters of these discount functions isolate the pure
effect of changes of impatience. Moreover, the assump-
tions of hyperbolic discount functions can be problem-
atic. They can accommodate only a limited degree of
decreasing impatience. Thus, they cannot be used for
people with increasing or strongly decreasing impa-
tience, both of which are found for a significant pro-
portion of subjects (Montiel Olea and Strzalecki 2014,
Attema et al. 2010). Thus, estimations of the parameters
of hyperbolic discount functions will lead to biased
estimates of changes in impatience.
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This paper introduces a flexible measure of chang-
ing impatience that can accommodate any degree of
decreasing or increasing impatience, and that is inde-
pendent of levels of impatience and utility curvature. It
can be used not only to detect deviations from constant
impatience, but also to analyze individual differences
in the degrees of such deviations. As the deviation
from constant impatience most commonly found in the
literature is decreasing impatience, the index will be
referred to as a decreasing impatience (DI) index. It
is a discrete approximation of Prelec’s (2004) measure
and can be computed from two indifferences, which
allows for efficient measurements in experiments and
surveys. Moreover, it can also be used conveniently for
nonmonetary outcome domains such as health states.
Unlike Prelec’s measure, the DI-index can also be used
for people with nondifferentiable discount functions,
like quasi-hyperbolic discounters. It does not require
any parametric restrictions on discounting and utility
functions. The DI-index also serves as a tool to charac-
terize and test discounting models.
The DI-index is similar to the hyperbolic factor,
which I introduced in previous work (Rohde 2010).
The hyperbolic factor was defined as a convenient
measure of decreasing impatience for people satisfy-
ing hyperbolic discounting. For generalized hyperbolic
discounting δ(t)  (1 + αt)−β/α, the hyperbolic factor
equals α. Thereby, unlike theDI-index introduced here,
the hyperbolic factor does not approximate Prelec’s
measure of decreasing impatience. A constant hyper-
bolic factor, for instance, corresponds to a degree of
decreasing impatience that decreases over time. The
DI-index indeed captures this decreasing degree of
decreasing impatience. Thereby, theDI-index is a better
measure of decreasing impatience, which can be used
not only to compare different people at a single point
in time, but also to assess how decreasing impatience
develops over time within a single person.
Another advantage of the DI-index over the hyper-
bolic factor is that the DI-index serves as a measure
of decreasing impatience even for people who sat-
isfy strongly decreasing impatience. In Bleichrodt et al.
(2016), for instance, the hyperbolic factor could not
be applied for between 5% and 10% of the subjects,
because of strongly decreasing impatience. Attema
et al. (2010), who found at least one instance of strongly
decreasing impatience for 80% of their subjects, devel-
oped heuristic measures of decreasing impatience to
analyze their data. Their heuristic measures apply only
to their trade-off sequences. Their measures are there-
fore based on a chained measurement of indifferences.
While the DI-index developed in this paper is based
on similar ideas, it does not require chained measure-
ments in experiments and therefore can also be used
efficiently in experiments using real incentives and in
surveys that do not allow for chained questions.
In an experiment, I show how the DI-index can be
implemented in practice, using real incentives. Inter-
estingly, the results show no correlation between the
DI-index and self-reported self-control problems. Fur-
ther research is required to establish the robustness of
these results. Yet, this is an indication that self-control
problems are not only driven by changes in impatience.
2. Decreasing and Increasing Impatience
This paper considers preferences < over timed outcomes
(t , x) ∈ T ×X that give outcome x at time t. T is a nonde-
generate closed subinterval of [0,∞) and the outcome
set X is any convex subset of m containing the out-
come “nothing” (x  0) as a reference outcome.1 We
assume that < is a continuous weak order. The rela-
tions 4,,≺, and ∼ are as usual. The outcome zero
represents a neutral outcome in the sense that (s , 0) ∼
(t , 0) for all s , t ∈ T. Preferences over outcomes x and y
are determined by preferences over these outcomes if
received at time
¯
t, the earliest time in T: x < y if and
only if (
¯
t , x) < (
¯
t , y). We assume that there is at least
one outcome that is preferred to zero (y  0).
Monotonicity holds if x < y implies (t , x) < (t , y) for
all t ∈ T, and x  y implies (t , x)  (t , y) for all t ∈ T.
Impatience holds if for all s < t we have that x  0
implies (s , x)  (t , x) and x ≺ 0 implies (s , x) ≺ (t , x).
Impatience means that an individual dislikes delays of
pleasant outcomes and likes delays of unpleasant ones.
Throughout this paper, we assume monotonicity and
impatience.
Constant impatience holds if for all x , y / 0, all s < t,
and all σ > 0 with s , t , s + σ, t + σ ∈ T we have that
(s , x) ∼ (t , y) implies (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + σ, y). Decreasing
impatience holds if for all s < t and σ > 0 with s, t , s + σ,
t + σ ∈ T we have that (i) y  x  0 and (s , x) ∼ (t , y)
imply (s + σ, x) 4 (t + σ, y) and (ii) y ≺ x ≺ 0 and (s , x) ∼
(t , y) imply (s + σ, x) < (t + σ, y). Increasing impatience
holds if the implied preferences are reversed. Consider
two pleasant outcomes y  x  0. If an individual is
willing to wait from s to t in order to receive y rather
than x, then according to constant impatience he is
equally willing to wait if both times are additionally
delayed by σ. Decreasing impatience means more will-
ingness to wait with the additional delay, and increas-
ing impatience means less willingness to wait.
Consider preferences <∗ that order outcomes in the
same way as < but may differ in the treatment of tim-
ing of outcomes.2 Preferences <∗ exhibit more decreas-
ing impatience than < if for all x , y, x∗ , y∗ with x / y
and x∗ /∗ y∗, and all s < t and σ ≥ 0 the indifferences
(s , x) ∼ (t , y), (s , x∗) ∼∗ (t , y∗), and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y)
imply (s + σ, x∗)4∗ (t + τ, y∗) if y∗ <∗ x∗, and (s + σ, x∗)<∗
(t + τ, y∗) if y∗ 4∗ x∗. This definition of comparative
decreasing impatience applies to decreasingly impa-
tient as well as increasingly impatient individuals.
For decreasingly impatient people, more decreasing
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impatience implies a larger deviation from constant
impatience. For increasingly impatient people, more
decreasing impatience implies a smaller deviation
from constant impatience.
Consider Ann, who has decreasing impatience and
satisfies (s , x) ∼ (t , y) and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y) for y 
x  0, s < t, and σ > 0. Then, τ must be at least as large
as σ, because if the extra delay τ were smaller than σ
she would be more willing to wait for the better out-
come y. The interval (t , t + τ − σ) can be interpreted
as an interval of vulnerability for time inconsistencies
in the following sense (Attema et al. 2010): for all t′ ∈
(t , t + τ − σ), Ann exhibits the inconsistent preferences
(s , x)  (t′, y) and (s+σ, x) ≺ (t′+σ, y). Let time be inter-
preted as the delay from decision time, as is common in
the literature. If asked todaywhether she wants to have
x with delay s + σ or y with delay t′ + σ, she prefers to
wait for the better outcome y. Once time passes, and
we let her reconsider her decision at time σ, she will
perceive the choice as being a choice between receiv-
ing x with delay s or receiving y with delay t′. If her
choices are time-invariant and, hence, still driven by
the same preference relation, she will now prefer not
to wait for the better outcome (Halevy 2015).
Assume that Bill, with preferences <∗, has an even
larger degree of decreasing impatience than Ann: his
increase in willingness to wait for the better outcome is
larger than Ann’s. Thus, if he satisfies (s , x∗) ∼∗ (t , y∗),
we have (s + σ, x∗) 4∗ (t + τ, y∗) for y∗  x∗. Therefore,
for him we have (s + σ, x∗) ∼∗ (t + τ∗ , y∗) with τ∗ at least
as large as τ. Thus, the larger the degree of decreasing
impatience, the larger τ. Bill’s interval of vulnerability
equals (t , t + τ∗ − σ). Thus, Bill’s interval of vulnerabil-
ity is larger than Ann’s, and for every θ ∈ (t + τ − σ,
t + τ∗ − σ) we have (s , x∗) ∗ (θ, y∗) and (s + σ, x∗) ≺∗
(θ+ σ, y∗), but (s , x)  (θ, y) and (s + σ, x)  (θ+ σ, y)—
i.e., inconsistent preferences for Bill, but not for Ann.
Thus, Bill will exhibit inconsistencies more frequently
than Ann. This could potentially make Bill more likely
than Ann to be a smoker, to be obese, to have credit
card debts, etc.
Many studies have found decreasing impatience
(Frederick et al. 2002, Attema 2012). Yet, little is known
about degrees of decreasing impatience and their cor-
relations with field behavior. Thus, when consider-
ing two people, such as Ann and Bill, many studies
have shown how to detect whether Ann and Bill sat-
isfy decreasing impatience, but only few have shown
how to measure whether Ann satisfies more (or less)
decreasing impatience than Bill. One of the reasons
for this limited knowledge about degrees of decreasing
impatience is that little is known about how tomeasure
them.
Table 1 gives an overview of several recent stud-
ies that compared degrees of decreasing impatience
between individuals or between groups. The most
common method to measure decreasing impatience in
surveys and experiments so far has been to estimate
the parameters of hyperbolic discount models for each
individual or group of individuals of interest. This type
of approach, however, has several drawbacks.
First, it can only capture restricted degrees of de-
creasing impatience. Hyperbolic discount models can-
not accommodate increasing impatience or strongly
decreasing impatience, which is observed for a signif-
icant proportion of subjects. Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012), for instance, found increasing impatience at the
aggregate level. At the individual level, several studies
reported frequencies of increasing impatience: between
10% and 65% of subjects in Attema et al. (2010); 18% for
gains and27% for losses inAbdellaoui et al. (2010); 1 out
of 65 in the first experiment of Abdellaoui et al. (2013)
and 26% in their second experiment; between 25% and
35% in Bleichrodt et al. (2016); 8% in Courtemanche
et al. (2015); 16.9% in Epper et al. (2011); 9% in Meier
and Sprenger (2010); at least 30% (10%) for money (ice
cream) in Montiel Olea and Strzalecki (2014); and 362
of the 550 observations in Takeuchi (2011). Strongly
decreasing impatience was observed at least once for
80% of the subjects in Attema et al. (2010) and between
5% and 8% of the cases in Bleichrodt et al. (2016). For
these increasingly and strongly decreasingly impatient
subjects, the mentioned approach, therefore, yields
biased estimates.
Second, most of the studies measuring the param-
eters of hyperbolic discount functions assume linear
utility, which (further) confounds the measurements.
Finally, theoretically these parameters do not neces-
sarily measure changes in impatience independently
from impatience levels. Consider, for instance, quasi-
hyperbolic discounting with discount function δ(t) 1
for t  0 and δ(t)  βδt for t > 0 with β, δ > 0 and
β, δ < 1. The parameter β is often thought to capture the
degree of changing impatience. Yet, as will be shown
in Section 4, β combines the change of impatience with
its level, and thereby does not isolate the degree of
changing impatience. This paper develops an index
of decreasing impatience, which has the flexibility to
capture any degree of decreasing or increasing impa-
tience, independently from assumptions about utility,
and independently from the level of impatience.
3. The DI-Index
The index of decreasing impatience, which is intro-
duced in this paper, measures the extent to which im-
patience changes over time and can be computed from
two indifferences as follows. For x , y ,/ 0, s < t, σ > 0,
and τ with
(s , x) ∼ (t , y) and (1)
(s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y), (2)
Rohde: Measuring Decreasing and Increasing Impatience
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Table 1. Overview of Recent Studies Comparing Degrees of Decreasing Impatience Between (Groups of) Subjects
Study Utility Discounting Chained Real incentives Outcomes
Attema et al. (2010) — Impatience Yes Hypothetical Money
Abdellaoui et al. (2010) Nonparametric elicitation — Yes Hypothetical Money
Abdellaoui et al. (2013) CARA Gen. hyp. and CRDI No Hypothetical and real Money
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) CRRA and CARA Quasi-hyp. No Real Money
Benhabib et al. (2010) CRRA δ(t) α(1− (1− θ)rt)1/(1−θ)−b/y No Real Money
Bleichrodt et al. (2016) — Impatience Yes Hypothetical Money and
health
Burks et al. (2009) Linear Quasi-hyp. No Real Money
Burks et al. (2012) Linear Quasi-hyp. No Real Money
Cairns and van der Pol (2000) Linear Gen. hyp. No Hypothetical Money and
lives
Courtemanche et al. (2015) Linear Quasi-hyp. No Hypothetical Money
Ebert and Prelec (2007) Linear or estimated CRDI No Hypothetical Money and
multiattribute diner voucher
and gift
certificates
Epper et al. (2011) CRRA Change in discount rate No Real Money
Galizzi et al. (2016) Linear Gen. hyp. with α  β No Hypothetical Health and
and quasi-hyp. money
Malkoc and Zauberman Linear Change in discount rate No Hypothetical Money and
(2006) concert ticket
Meier and Sprenger (2010) Linear Quasi-hyp. No Real Money
Montiel Olea and Strzalecki — Quasi-hyp. No Hypothetical Money and
(2014) ice cream
Takahashi (2007) Linear Gen. hyp. No Hypothetical Money
Takeuchi (2011) Expected utility δ(t) 1/(1+ θ(rq)q)1/q No Real Money
Tanaka et al. (2010) Linear Quasi-hyp. No Real Money
Zauberman et al. (2009) Linear Change in discount rate No Hypothetical Gift certificate
Notes. The column “Utility” indicates which assumptions or estimations the studies made regarding utility (— means that no assumptions
were made and no estimation was required). The column “Discounting” indicates which assumptions were made regarding discounting
(these discount functions are defined later in the paper). “Gen. hyp.” refers to generalized hyperbolic discounting. “Change in discount rate”
refers to an analysis of the change in the discount rate as time changes. The column “Chained” indicates whether the studies used a chained
measurement method. The column “Real incentives” indicates whether payoffs were hypothetical or real. Finally, the column “Outcomes”
gives the types of outcomes used in the studies.
the decreasing impatience (DI) index is defined by
DI τ− σ
σ(t − s) .
Constant, decreasing, and increasing impatience corre-
spond to the DI-index being zero, positive, or negative,
respectively. The difference between t and s captures
the level of impatience. For given s and t, the differ-
ence between τ and σ captures the degree of decreas-
ing impatience: the larger this difference, the larger the
degree of decreasing impatience. The DI-index takes
the difference between τ and σ relative to σ, and cor-
rects it for the level of impatience by dividing by (t− s).
The DI-index can be constructed as a function of four
variables from the set s, x, t, y, σ, and τ as specified in
the indifference pair (1) and (2). This subset of variables
depends on the method used to obtain the indiffer-
ences. This paper will consider two ways to elicit the
indifferences, each with its own advantages, the prac-
tical details of which will be discussed in Section 5.
The first approach to obtain an indifference pair is
to construct DI(y , s , t , τ) by fixing outcome y, time
points s and t, and delay τ, and eliciting the corres-
ponding x and σ that give indifferences (1) and (2).
Continuity, monotonicity, and impatience ensure that
DI(y , s , t , τ) is well defined. The properties of the
hyperbolic factor in Rohde (2010) were derived based
on this approach to obtain indifference pairs. The cur-
rent paper, unlike Rohde (2010), does not commit to a
particular elicitation method so as to give maximum
flexibility to researchers who want to apply the index
in practice.
The second approach to obtaining an indifference
pair is to construct DI(x , y , s , σ) by fixing outcomes x
and y, time point s, and delay σ, and eliciting the cor-
responding t and τ that give indifferences (1) and (2).
One of the practical advantage of this second approach
over the first one is that it allows for a nonchainedmea-
surement that makes it more suitable for use in exper-
iments with real incentives and in surveys that do not
allow for chained measurements, as will be discussed
further in Section 5. This practical advantage, however,
comes at the cost of DI(x , y , s , σ) being undefined if t
and/or τ do not exist—i.e., if an indifference pair as
in (1) and (2) does not exist.
Rohde: Measuring Decreasing and Increasing Impatience
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In the remainder of the paper, we will derive re-
sults for both functional specifications: DI(y , s , t , τ)
and DI(x , y , s , σ). The next two theorems show that
DI(y , s , t , τ) is a proper measure of decreasing impa-
tience. The proofs are in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Preferences < exhibit decreasing impatience if
and only if DI(y , s , t , τ) ≥ 0 for all outcomes y / 0, all time
points s < t, and all delays τ ≥ 0. Preferences < exhibit
increasing impatience if and only if DI(y , s , t , τ) ≤ 0 for all
outcomes y / 0, all time points s < t, and all delays τ ≥ 0.
Theorem 2. Preferences <∗ exhibit more decreasing impa-
tience than < if and only if DI∗(y∗ , s , t , τ) ≥ DI(y , s , t , τ)
for all outcomes y / 0 and y∗ / 0, all time points s < t, and
all delays τ ≥ 0.
DI(x , y , s , σ) is a measure of decreasing impatience
according to a slightly different definition of com-
parative decreasing impatience, which we will call
outcome-gauged decreasing impatience. Preferences
<∗ satisfymore outcome-gauged decreasing impatience than
< if for all x , y with x / y and x /∗ y, all s ≥ 0, and
all σ > 0 the indifferences (s , x) ∼ (t , y), (s , x) ∼∗ (t∗ , y),
(s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y), and (s + σ, x) ∼∗ (t∗ + τ∗ , y) imply
(τ∗ − σ)/(t∗ − s) ≥ (τ− σ)/(t − s).
Comparative outcome-gauged decreasing impa-
tience starts from an indifference between given out-
comes to be received at starting point s and another
time point t, and considers what happenswhen a delay
σ is added to both outcomes. For all individuals who
are compared, comparative outcome-gauged decreas-
ing impatience considers the same outcomes x and y
and starting point s. Comparative decreasing impa-
tience, as defined earlier in this section, could also
be referred to as comparative time-gauged decreasing
impatience, as it starts from an indifference between
outcomes to be received at two fixed points in time s
and t, and then consider what happens when a com-
mon delay σ is added. For all individuals, comparative
decreasing impatience considers the same given points
in time s and t, while comparative outcome-gauged
decreasing impatience considers the same given out-
comes x and y. Intuitively, we can say that Ann satisfies
more decreasing impatience than Bill if Ann’s impa-
tience between time points s and t decreases more
sharply than Bill’s when a common delay is added.
Similarly, Ann satisfies more outcome-gauged decreas-
ing impatience than Bill if Ann’s impatience between
outcomes x and y decreases more sharply than Bill’s
when a common delay is added. The following theo-
rems follow immediately.
Theorem 3. Preferences < exhibit decreasing impatience if
and only if DI(x , y , s , σ) ≥ 0 for all outcomes x , y with 0 ≺
x ≺ y or y ≺ x ≺ 0, all time points s, and all delays σ ≥ 0
for which DI(x , y , s , σ) is defined. Preferences < exhibit
increasing impatience if and only if DI(x , y , s , σ) ≤ 0 for all
outcomes x , y with 0≺ x ≺ y or y ≺ x ≺ 0, all time points s,
and all delays σ ≥ 0 for which DI(x , y , s , σ) is defined.
Theorem 4. Preferences <∗ exhibit more outcome-gauged
decreasing impatience than < if and only if DI∗(x , y , s , σ) ≥
DI(x , y , s , σ) for all outcomes x , y with x / y and x /∗ y,
all time points s ≥ 0, and all delays σ ≥ 0 for which
DI(x , y , s , σ) and DI∗(x , y , s , σ) are defined.
3.1. The DI-Index and Prelec’s Measure
Prelec (2004) was the first to analyze comparative de-
creasing impatience. He applied his definition of com-
parative decreasing impatience in a setting with sepa-
rability, which I will refer to as discounted utility, and
which holds if preferences < can be represented by
DU(t , x) δ(t)u(x),
where δ is a discount function and u a utility function.
Throughout this paper,wewill only assumediscounted
utility if explicitly mentioned. Prelec showed that the
Pratt–Arrowdegree of convexity of the logarithmof the
discount function is an appropriatemeasure of decreas-
ing impatience. His measure is defined by
P(t)−[ln δ(t)]
′′
[ln δ(t)]′ .
The same Pratt–Arrow degree of convexity has been
applied for utility to capture risk aversion (Pratt 1964).
At first sight, Prelec’s measure P(t) seems complex
to obtain from data, as the discount function first needs
to be measured. Measuring the discount function often
requires assumptions about, or a measurement of, the
utility function, and often involves assuming a specific
parametric form of the discount function. Attema et al.
(2010) developed a nonparametric method to measure
the discount functionwithout first requiring a fullmea-
surement of the utility function. The DI-index is based
on similar ideas. It does not require assumptions about
utility and discount functions. It also does not require
a measurement of utility. It is a local approximation of
Prelec’s (2004) measure P(t) under discounted utility,
but does not require differentiability of the discount
function.
Theorem 5. Under discounted utility, the following holds
if [ln(δ)]′ is continuously differentiable.3
(i) For all outcomes y / 0, time points s < t, and delays
τ > 0,
lim
s→t
lim
τ→0
DI(y , s , t , τ) P(t).
(ii) For all outcomes x , y / 0, with x / y, all time points
s, and all delays σ > 0,
lim
x→y
lim
σ→0
DI(x , y , s , σ) P(s).
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3.2. The DI-Index and the Hyperbolic Factor
The DI-index is obtained from the same indifferences
as the hyperbolic factor (Rohde 2010). The hyperbolic
factor is a measure of decreasing impatience, which
works well for hyperbolic discounting. The hyperbolic
factor equals α, the parameter of the generalized hyper-
bolic discount function δ(t)  (1 + αt)−β/α, which is
related to the degree of decreasing impatience. It is
given by
H 
τ− σ
tσ− sτ
for indifferences (1) and (2). When s equals zero, the
hyperbolic factor and the DI-index coincide. Yet, unlike
the DI-index, the hyperbolic factor does not approxi-
mate Prelec’s measure. For generalized hyperbolic dis-
counting, δ(t)  (1 + αt)−β/α, Prelec’s measure equals
P(t)  α/(1 + αt). Thus, a generalized hyperbolic dis-
counter has a decreasing degree of decreasing impa-
tience (P(t) decreases with t), but a constant hyper-
bolic factor α. From the hyperbolic factor, one may
then wrongly conclude that a generalized hyperbolic
discounter has a constant degree of decreasing impa-
tience. Thus, while the hyperbolic factor can be used to
compare different people for a given point in time t, it
cannot be used to compare the degrees of decreasing
impatience at different points in time within a single
person.
This is not the only drawback of the hyperbolic fac-
tor compared to the DI-index. The hyperbolic factor
serves as a measure of decreasing impatience only for
people who exhibit moderately decreasing impatience
or increasing impatience. It cannot be used for peo-
ple with strongly decreasing impatience—i.e., when
tσ − sτ < 0.4 Monotonicity and impatience do not rule
out such strongly decreasing impatience. Attema et al.
(2010), for instance, found at least one choice with
strongly decreasing impatience for 80% of their sub-
jects. They therefore introduced alternative, heuris-
tic measures of nonconstant impatience to analyze
their time-tradeoff sequences. These heuristic mea-
sures require the measurement of a time-tradeoff
sequence and therefore require a chained measure-
ment technique in experiments. In other words, to
obtain these heuristic measures, one has to ask ques-
tions that depend on answers to previous questions.
The hyperbolic factor and the DI-index do not require
such chained measurements. Another recent study
measuring decreasing impatience is Bleichrodt et al.
(2016). They found that between 5% and 10% of their
subjects had strongly decreasing impatience and could
therefore not be studied with the hyperbolic factor. The
DI-index does not suffer from this problem and can
be computed for all people once the required indiffer-
ences are obtained. The following example illustrates a
case of strongly decreasing impatience.
Example 1. Consider discounted utility with DU(t , x)
 e0.1e−ct−0.1u(x). Suppose we found x and y such that
indifferences (1) and (2) hold for s  1, t  2, and σ  3.
Then, for c  0.30 we get τ ≈ 5.38, so that tσ − sτ > 0.
However, for c  0.35 we get τ ≈ 7.31, so that tσ − sτ
< 0—i.e., we obtain strongly decreasing impatience. In
the latter case, the DI-index can be used, while the
hyperbolic factor cannot.
Before elaborating on the properties of the DI-index
for discounted utility models with (quasi-)hyperbolic
discount functions, we consider an example of a model
of intertemporal choice that is not a discounted utility
model.
Example 2. Baucells and Heukamp (2012) introduced
the probability and time trade-offmodel of preferences
over triples of the form (x , p , t), which give outcome
x ∈  at time t with probability p. Letting p  1, this
model can also be used for preferences over timed out-
comes (see alsoNoor 2011). For riskless outcomes, their
model is given by V(x , t)  w(e−rx t)v(x), where w is
a weighting function and rx is an outcome-dependent
discount rate. For this example, it suffices to consider
linear w :
V(x , t) e−rx tv(x)
for all x , t, with rx strictly decreasing in x. The indif-
ference pair (s , x) ∼ (t , y) and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y) with
s < t, x ≺ y, and σ > 0 implies that
e−rx s
e−ry t

e−rx (s+σ)
e−ry (t+τ)
,
which implies that τ (rx/ry)σ. As x ≺ y, we have x < y
and rx > ry . Thus, τ > σ. Moreover, for this indifference
pair, we have
DI
rx − ry
ln(v(y)) − ln(v(x))+ (rx − ry)s .
It follows that DI > 0, which means that we have
decreasing impatience. In this example, the decreasing
impatience is driven by the discount rate depending
on the outcomes. If we delay outcome x by an addi-
tional σ, then it is discounted by an extra factor e−rxσ.
The same extra delay applied to outcome y generates
an extra discount of e−ryσ. If rx were equal to ry , the
extra delay σ would have the same impact on both out-
comes, thereby leaving preferences unchanged. Yet, as
rx is larger than ry , outcome y needs to be delayed
more to generate the same extra discount factor.
If one were to define f (x , t)  e−rx t , then ln( f (x , t))
−rx t,
∂ ln( f (x , t))
∂t
−rx ,
and
∂2 ln( f (x , t))
∂t∂t
 0,
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so that Prelec’s measure would equal
P(t)− 0−rx  0
for this given x. Thus, for this model, Prelec’s measure
cannot be applied, as discounted utility is not satisfied.
It would wrongly suggest there to be no decreasing
impatience (P(t) 0), while τ > σ.
4. The DI-Index Related to
Discount Models
The DI-index is model free and therefore does not re-
quire the decision maker to satisfy discounted utility.
Decisionmodels such as discounted utility impose par-
ticular regularities on the DI-index. In fact, the indif-
ference pairs used to measure the DI-index can also
be used to characterize and test discounted utility and
various specific discount functions, as will be shown in
this section.
Samuelson (1937) introduced constant discounting,
which holds if discounted utility holds with discount
function δ(t)  δt for some δ with 0 < δ < 1. Constant
discounting implies constant impatience and thereby
always yields a DI-index equal to zero. It is also the
only model that does so.
Theorem 6. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) Constant discounted utility holds.
(ii) For all x , y / 0, s < t, and σ > 0 with (s , x) ∼
(t , y) and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y), we have τ  σ—
i.e., DI(y , s , t , τ)DI(x , y , s , σ) 0.
Currently, quasi-hyperbolic discounting is the most
popular alternative to constant discounting in eco-
nomic applications. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds
if discounted utility holds with δ(t)  1 for t  0 and
δ(t) βδt for t > 0 with β, δ > 0 and β, δ < 1. This model
was introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) and pop-
ularized by Laibson (1997). It captures a present-bias
through the parameter β. Prelec’s measure of decreas-
ing impatience cannot be computed for this discount
function, as it is not differentiable. The DI-index, how-
ever, does not require differentiability and can be com-
puted for quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
Theorem 7. The following statements are equivalent for all
β, δ with 0 < β < 1 and 0 < δ < 1 :
(i) Quasi-hyperbolic discounted utility holds with δ(t)
βδt for t > 0 and δ(0) 1.
(ii) For all x , y / 0, s < t and σ > 0 with (s , x) ∼ (t , y)
and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y), we have the following:
(a) if s > 0, then τ  σ, so DI(y , s , t , τ)  DI(x , y ,
s , σ) 0;
(b) if s  0, then DI(y , 0, t , τ)  DI(x , y , 0, σ) 
(ln(β)/ln(δ))/(σt).
An interesting and important observation following
from this theorem is that β in the quasi-hyperbolic
discount model is a function of both the change in
impatience (DI) and δ, which is related to the level of
impatience. Thus, it is not β, but β relative to δ, which
determines the degree of decreasing impatience.5
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting makes a clear distinc-
tion between the present and the future. An alternative
model with similar properties is the two-stage expo-
nential model by Pan et al. (2015), which makes a
clear distinction between the near and distant future.
Two-stage exponential discounting holds if δ(t)  αt
for t ≤ λ, and δ(t)  (α/β)λβt for t > λ. This model
assumes constant impatience, yet different discount
rates, before and after time λ. Just like the quasi-
hyperbolic discount function, the two-stage exponen-
tial discount function is not differentiable. Therefore,
Prelec’s measure cannot be used tomeasure the change
of impatience around λ, while the DI-index can.
Theorem 8. The following statements are equivalent for all
α, β with 0 < β ≤ 1 and 0 < α ≤ 1 :
(i) Two-stage exponential discounting holds with δ(t) 
αt for t ≤ λ and δ(t) (α/β)λβt for t > λ.
(ii) For all x , y / 0, s < t, and σ > 0 with (s , x) ∼ (t , y)
and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y), we have
(a) DI(y , s , t , τ)  DI(x , y , s , σ)  0 if s , t , s + σ, t +
τ > λ and if s , t , s + σ, t + τ < λ;
(b) DI(y ,s , t ,τ)DI(x , y ,s ,σ) ((λ− s)/(σ(t− s))) ·
(ln(α/β)/ln(β)) if s<λ< t ,s+σ, t+τ;
(c) DI(y ,s , t ,τ)DI(x , y ,s ,σ) (1/(t − s))(ln(α/β)/
ln(β)) if s ,s+σ<λ< t , t+τ;
(d) DI(y , s , t , τ)  DI(x , y , s , σ)  (1/σ)(ln(α/β)/
ln(β)) if s , t < λ < s + σ, t + τ;
(e) DI(y , s , t , τ)  DI(x , y , s , σ)  ((t + σ − λ)/
(σ(t − s)))(ln(α/β)/ln(β)) if s , t , s + σ < λ < t + τ;
(f) (s , x′) ∼ (t , y′) implies (s + σ, x′) ∼ (t + τ, y′).
Quasi-hyperbolic and two-stage exponential dis-
counting both assume constant discounting at most
points in time and deviations from it only around a
single point in time, zero and λ, respectively. General-
ized hyperbolic discounting assumes decreasing impa-
tience throughout and, in this sense, captures more
frequent deviations from constant discounting. Gen-
eralized hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein and Prelec
1992) holds if discounted utility holds with δ(t) 
(1+ αt)−β/α with α, β > 0.
Theorem 9. The following statements are equivalent for all
α, β > 0 :
(i) Generalized hyperbolic discounted utility holds with
δ(t) (1+ αt)−β/α.
(ii) For all x , y / 0, s < t, and σ > 0 with (s , x) ∼ (t , y)
and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y), we have
DI(y , s , t , τ)DI(x , y , s , σ) α1+ αs .
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From this theorem it follows that β is unrelated
to the degree of decreasing impatience. Generalized
hyperbolic discounting implies that τ in condition (ii)
of Theorem 9 equals σ(1+ αt)/(1+ αs).
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting only accounts for a
present bias and assumes constant impatience when
the present is not involved. Generalized hyperbolic
discounting accommodates decreasing impatience also
when the present is not involved. Yet, it limits the
degree of decreasing impatience that can be accounted
for, becauseDI< 1/s for all α > 0. Bleichrodt et al. (2009)
and Ebert and Prelec (2007) introduced the CADI and
CRDI discount functions, which are the intertemporal
analogues of CARA and CRRA utility and can account
for any degree of decreasing, and even increasing,
impatience. CADI discounting holds if discounted util-
ity holds with δ(t) ke re−ct for r, c , k > 0, δ(t) ke−rt for
r, k > 0, or δ(t) ke−re−ct for r, k > 0 and c < 0. It implies
constant decreasing impatience according to Prelec’s
measure: P(t)  c. Thus, the DI-index provides a dis-
crete approximation of c. Yet, it is not exactly equal to c
and we omit its expression, which is messy and does
not add extra insight. CRDI discounting, recently called
unit invariant discounting by Bleichrodt et al. (2013),
holds if discounted utility holds with δ(t)  ke rt1−d for
r, k > 0 and d > 1 for all t , 0, δ(t)  kt−r for r, k > 0 for
all t , 0, or δ(t)  ke−rt1−d for r, k > 0 and d < 1 for all t.
As d/t equals Prelec’s measure of decreasing impa-
tience, the DI-index provides a discrete approximation
of d/t. Yet, it is not exactly equal to d/t and we omit
its expression, which is messy and does not add extra
insight. Appendix A gives theorems that characterize
CADI and CRDI discounting using the DI-index.
5. Measuring the DI-Index in
Experiments and Surveys
The DI-index is a simple measure of decreasing impa-
tience, which can be computed from only two indiffer-
ences. This simplicity makes it a useful tool for exper-
iments and surveys, where the degree of decreasing
impatience can now easily be measured and related
to other behavioral and socioeconomic variables. Such
experiments and surveys will be useful in studying the
empirical relation between decreasing impatience and
time inconsistency. This section will discuss in more
detail how the two indifferences, required to compute
the DI-index, can be elicited.
I propose two procedures to elicit the two indiffer-
ences, each with their own advantages. The first proce-
dure is most appealing from a theoretical perspective,
which is why I will refer to it as procedure T. It yields
DI(y , s , t , τ) and goes as follows:
1. Fix two points in time s < t.
2. Fix one outcome y and verify that y / 0.
3. Elicit x such that (s , x) ∼ (t , y).
4. Fix τ > 0 such that t + τ ∈ T.
5. Elicit σ such that (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y).
Themajor advantage of this procedure is that it ensures
that we will indeed find an indifference pair. Mono-
tonicity and impatience guarantee that x can be found:
if y  0 we have (s , 0) 4 (t , y) 4 (s , y), and if y ≺ 0 we
have (s , 0) < (t , y) < (s , y), both of which imply that
there must be an x such that (s , x) ∼ (t , y). Similarly, a σ
can be found as required. Yet, this procedure has sev-
eral practical disadvantages, which a more practically
appealing procedure, procedure P, does not have.
Procedure P yields DI(x , y , s , σ) and elicits the two
indifferences as follows:
1. Fix two outcomes x and y and verify that y  x  0
or 0  x  y.
2. Fix time s.
3. Elicit time t such that (s , x) ∼ (t , y).
4. Fix σ > 0 such that s + σ ∈ T.
5. Elicit τ such that (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y).
Procedure P has one disadvantage: there might be no
t and/or no τ that satisfies the mentioned properties.
In this case, the indifference pair does not exist and the
DI-index cannot be computed. Procedure T does not
have this problem. Yet, procedure P has three major
advantages compared to procedure T. The first advan-
tage of procedure P is that, unlike procedure T, it is
not chained, which means that the two indifferences
can be elicited independently from each other. Thus,
the value of t elicited for the first indifference does not
influence the questions that will be asked to elicit τ for
the second indifference. Thismakes it possible to imple-
ment the measurement of the DI-index in experiments
with real incentives in an incentive-compatiblemanner.
If, instead, the procedure would be chained, then sub-
jects in an experiment with real incentives could have
an incentive not to report their true indifference value
of t, which could result in a biasedmeasurement.More-
over, chained elicitations are complicated to implement
outside of the laboratory in field studies or large gen-
eral population surveys, as they require a computerized
implementation or the presence of an interviewer.
The second advantage of procedure P is that for both
indifferences the subject is asked to reveal a point of
indifference in the same dimension (the time dimen-
sion). This minimizes confounds caused by scale com-
patibility (Tversky et al. 1988). Assume that an individ-
ual satisfies discounted utility and overweighs the time
dimension, the dimension in which the indifference
is elicited. Then, the indifference (s , x) ∼ (t , y) implies
λ ln(δ(s)) + ln(u(x))  λ ln(δ(t)) + ln(u(y)), with λ > 1
the weight attached to the time dimension. Similarly,
(s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y) implies λ ln(δ(s + σ)) + ln(u(x)) 
λ ln(δ(t + τ)) + ln(u(y)). Thus, combining these indif-
ferences yields ln(δ(s)) − ln(δ(t))  ln(δ(s + σ)) −
ln(δ(t + τ)), independently of the weight λ. Hence, the
DI-index is independent of λ.
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The third advantage of procedure P is that it elic-
its indifferences in the time dimension, a dimension
that is easy to describe and understand. This makes
the method suitable also when considering outcome
domains that are nonnumerical, like health states. Elic-
iting indifferences in the outcome domain would be
inconvenient for health states, which often cannot be
described by real numbers (Bleichrodt et al. 2016).
The preferred procedurewill depend on the purpose
of the study that applies the DI-index. The remain-
der of this paper illustrates procedure P implemented
in an experiment. Future research will shed further
light on the feasibility of both procedures. No matter
which procedure, one should note that once one value
of the DI-index has been computed after observing one
indifference pair as in (1) and (2), only one extra indif-
ference is required to compute yet another value of
the DI-index. This other indifference would be similar
to (2), butwith a different σ and corresponding τ. Thus,
to compute n independent values of the DI-index, one
does not need 2n but only n + 1 indifferences.
6. Experiment
I conducted two experiments to illustrate how proce-
dure P can be implemented in practice. The setup and
results of both experiments are similar. The remain-
der of this paper will describe the second experiment,
which was a bit more elaborate than the first one.
Details and results of the first experiment are in the
supplementary material.
6.1. Design
6.1.1. Subjects. I recruited 125 subjects from Erasmus
University Rotterdam. They were distributed over five
experimental sessions. Subjects received a fixed fee of
e5 for participating. In addition, real incentives were
implemented as will be explained later.
6.1.2. Choice Lists. Subjects were asked to choose
between receiving e40 at a specified point in time or
e50 at a later point in time. They were asked to fill out
choice lists to determine t0, t2, and t4 in the following
three indifferences:
e40 in 0 weeks+ 1 day∼ e50 in t0 weeks+ 1 day,
e40 in 2 weeks+ 1 day∼ e50 in t2 weeks+ 1 day,
e40 in 4 weeks+ 1 day∼ e50 in t4 weeks+ 1 day.
Time t0 varied between zero weeks and 51 weeks, t2
between 2 weeks and 53 weeks, and t4 between 4 and
55 weeks. Two versions of the experiment were created
based on two orders: t0 − t2 − t4 and t4 − t2 − t0, with 63
subjects facing the first order and 62 the other one. The
instructions are in the supplementary material.
6.1.3. Demographic and Behavioral Questions. Next
to illustrating how to measure DI-indices in practice,
I also wanted to get an impression of the correlation
between DI-indices and self-reported measures of time
inconsistencies and self-control problems. After the
choice lists, subjects were therefore asked additional
questions, which we will refer to as behavioral questions.
First, I asked the self-control questions of Ameriks et al.
(2007). Subjects were asked how they would distribute
10 dinner vouchers over the next two years. They were
asked for their ideal distribution and their expected
actual behavior. The exact phrasing of the questions
can be found in the instructions in the supplementary
material. Following Ameriks et al. (2007), the EIgap
was computed as the difference between expected con-
sumption in the first year and ideal consumption in the
first year (see supplementary material, d minus a).6
Next, a set of questions asked for the number of
hours per week the subjects do sports, whether they
smoke, the number of days per week they drink alco-
hol, the number of glasses drank on such days, their
length and weight, age and gender, whether they live
in the same house as their parents, field of studies,
when they started their bachelor studies, nationality,
whether they save money, how much they save per
month, and how much money they have on a savings
account. Weight and length were converted into body
mass index (bmi), which equals weight (kg) divided by
length (m) squared. Field of studies is transformed into
a dummy variable equal to 1 if the field is economics
and/or business.
Finally, the self-awareness questions in Table B.1 of
Appendix B were asked on an eight-point Likert scale
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (8). These
questionswere constructed to reflect awareness of adis-
crepancy between actual and optimal behavior as per-
ceived by the subjects, thereby reflecting awareness of
self-control problems. The first question was borrowed
from the DNB household survey and is an adapted ver-
sion of a question by Strathman et al. (1994).
6.1.4. Implementation and Incentives. The experi-
ment was carried out using paper and pencil. Sub-
jects were informed that at the end of the experiment
four subjects within each session would be randomly
selected to be paid according to one randomly selected
decision in their choice lists. Payment was done by
bank transfer. We implemented a front-end delay of
one day in the indifferences to ensure that each pay-
ment would involve a transfer of money to the subject’s
bank account. Thus, choices cannot be driven by differ-
ences in payment procedures.
6.2. Results
Several subjects violated basic assumptions: four sub-
jects switched more than once in at least one of the
choice lists; 13 subjects indirectly violated impatience
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by having t0 > t2 or t2 > t4; and one subject violated
monotonicity by always choosing the e40. We drop
these subjects from our sample, leaving us with 107
subjects in total (27 female, 80 male, average age
19.4, 99 studying economics or business). Table B.2
in Appendix B gives summary statistics. Table B.3 in
Appendix B gives the correlations between the self-
awareness and EIgap variables.
Figure 1 shows the histograms of t0 , t2, and t4.
As discussed in Section 5, the drawback of proce-
dure P to measure decreasing impatience is that one
may not obtain an indifference point for some subjects,
whichmakes it impossible to calculate their DI-indices.
Figure 1. (Color online) Histograms of t0, t2, and t4
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Figure 2. (Color online) Distributions of DI02 and DI24
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This drawback was experienced to some extent in this
experiment: some subjects always chose to wait for e50
in at least one of the choice lists. For the subjects who
did switch from e50 later to e40 sooner, t0, t2, and t4
are computed as the midpoint between the two delays
where the subject switched. For each subject, we com-
puted two DI-indices: one using the indifferences with
t0 and t2, and one using the indifferences with t2 and t4.
We refer to them as DI02 andDI24, respectively.We used
one day as the unit of time in our calculations. For 94
(91) subjects we can compute DI02 (DI24). Figure 2 plots
DI02 and DI24 for the 91 subjects for whomwe can com-
pute both DI-indices.
It is a pity that the DI-index could not be computed
for all subjects. This could have been avoided by, for
instance, using another unit of time in the choice lists—
for instance, months—so that the very patient subjects
would also show a switching point. Yet, then wewould
have lost quite some variance in the switching points
of the very impatient subjects, as one can see from Fig-
ure 1. The latter would have reduced statistical power
in the analysis of correlation between DI-indices and
the demographic and behavioral variables. One could
imagine that the subjects for whom we could not com-
pute DI-indices are the more rational ones in the sense
that they are also the most patient ones. In that respect,
we would expect that their DI-indices would be closer
to zero than those of the other subjects. Thus, dropping
the very patient subjects from our analysis may have
led to an upward bias in the absolute values of the DI-
indices. In any case, it is good to bear in mind that our
results may not generalize to the most patient subjects.
6.2.1. Deviations from Constant Discounting. Table 2
summarizes the signs of the DI indices. For some sub-
jects, we could not compute aDI-index but can still con-
clude whether they have decreasing impatience. This
is the case for DI02 when there is an indifference value
for t0, but none for t2, as the subject always chooses e50
in the choice list to determine t2. Similarly, this is the
case for DI24 if there is a value for t2 but none for t4.
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Table 2. Deviations from Constant Discounting
DI02 DI24
Decreasing impatience (DI > 0) 43 (44)a 36 (39)
Constant impatience (DI 0) 28 21
Increasing impatience (DI < 0) 23 34
aThe numbers between parentheses are if we include the subjects
for whom we cannot compute a DI-index but can conclude that they
are decreasingly impatient.
If we include only the subjects for whom we could
compute DI02 or DI24, we observe decreasing impa-
tience at the aggregate level from t0 to t2 (p  0.019
for sign test, p  0.000 for Wilcoxon signed-rank test),
and constant discounting from t2 to t4 (p  0.905 for
sign test, p  0.443 for Wilcoxon signed-rank test). We
draw the same conclusions when including subjects
for whom we could not compute a DI-index but could
conclude that they have decreasing impatience.
Overall, more than 50% of our subjects deviate from
constant discounting. Moreover, a substantial propor-
tion of subjects exhibit increasing impatience. Thus,
there is substantial heterogeneity between subjects.
Hyperbolic discount models cannot be estimated for
these increasingly impatient subjects, illustrating the
need for a tool like the DI-index to analyze discount-
ing at the level of individuals. Regarding the deviations
from constant discounting, it is important to note that
the experiment was carried out with paper and pencil,
thereby allowing subjects to check what they answered
on previous questions. Thus, subjects who wanted to
be consistent by exhibiting constant discounting could
easily do so.
6.2.2. Test of Constant Decreasing Impatience. The
results so far show that at the aggregate level, we
have evidence for quasi-hyperbolic or two-stage expo-
nential discounting: decreasing impatience at first and
constant impatience later on. This suggests that DI02
and DI24 are not equal and even uncorrelated. DI02
indeed exceeds DI24 (p  0.007, Wilcoxon signed-rank
test). Of all 91 subjects for whom we can compute
both DI02 and DI24, 57 satisfy DI02 > DI24 and 26 sat-
isfy DI02 <DI24. There is no significant Spearman rank
correlation between DI02 and DI24 (p  0.184).
6.2.3. Correlation Between DI-Index and Demographic
Variables. Of the subjects for whom we could com-
pute DI02, 69 are male and 25 female. For DI24, we
have 67 males and 24 females. DI02 and DI24 are not
correlated with age or gender (p  0.931 and 0.656 for
age and 0.593 and 0.491 for gender, Spearman rank-
correlation).
6.2.4. Correlation Between DI-Index and Behavioral
Variables. We analyze the Spearman rank correlation
between the behavioral variables and DI02 or DI24.
None of these correlations are significant at a 5% sig-
nificance level. For each of these variables, we also run
an OLS, logit, or ordered logit regression (depending
on the type of variable) of the variable on one of the
DI-indices (DI02 or DI24), age and gender. In none of
these regressions is the coefficient on the DI-index sig-
nificant at a 5% level, except for hours of sports on DI02,
but this is driven by one outlier.
6.2.5. Monetary Discount Factors. To compare the DI
indices with traditional measures of time preference,
daily monetary discount factors corresponding to the
three elicited indifferences are computed as follows for
the subjects for whom we have the required indiffer-
ence points:
md0 
40
50
1/(7·t0+1−1)
,
md2 
40
50
1/(7·t2+1−7·2−1)
,
md4 
40
50
1/(7·t4+1−7·4−1)
.
These monetary discount factors range from 0.938 to
0.999 and are not correlated with gender or age (Spear-
man rank correlation). As expected from theDI indices,
md2 is larger than md0 (Spearman rank correlation, p 
0.0065), but there is no significant difference between
md2 and md4.
Some of the monetary discount factors are corre-
lated with behavioral variables according to a Spear-
man rank correlation test: md2 and sports (neg., p 
0.039), md0 and savingsaccount (pos., p  0.047), md2
and savingsaccount (pos., p  0.012), md2 and sportswish
(pos., p  0.046), md0 and sportsshould (pos., p  0.018),
md2 and sportsshould (pos., p  0.010), and md4 and
sportsshould (pos., p  0.026). All signs of the corre-
lations are intuitive, except for the correlation with
sports.
In the regressions, the coefficients on the monetary
discount factors deviated from zero in several cases:
field of studies on md2 (pos., p  0.036), sports on md4
(neg., p  0.015), sportswish on md4 (pos., p  0.008),
sportsshould onmd4 (pos., p0.035), studyshould onmd0
(neg., p  0.045), postpone on md4 (pos., p  0.031), and
EIgap on md4 (neg., p  0.004). All signs of the correla-
tions can be viewed as intuitive, except for the correla-
tion with sports and postpone.
7. Interpretation
The results of the experiment support quasi-hyperbolic
or two-stage exponential discounting at the aggregate
level, as subjects on average display decreasing impa-
tience for the very near future (DI02) and constant impa-
tience after (DI24). In the experiment described in the
supplementarymaterial,we found constant impatience
also for the near future. Yet, the results of both exper-
iments show substantial heterogeneity between sub-
jects. Many subjects (>50%) deviated from constant
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impatience, some in the direction of decreasing impa-
tience and others in the direction of increasing impa-
tience. Increasing impatience is quite prevalent at the
individual level. Thus, data fitting at the individual
level cannot be done using hyperbolic discount models
but requires models that can accommodate increas-
ing impatience, like CADI and CRDI discounting, as
introduced by Bleichrodt et al. (2009) and Ebert and
Prelec (2007).
Interestingly, the DI-indices were not correlatedwith
the self-reported behavioral variables. This finding
indicates that decreasing impatience is not the only
driver of time-inconsistent behavior and related self-
control problems. Several other studies also found no
association between decreasing impatience and self-
control problems in daily life (Tanaka et al. 2010
and Delaney and Lades 2017). Yet, others have docu-
mented a correlation between the degree of decreas-
ing impatience and behavioral and demographic vari-
ables (Burks et al. 2009, 2012; Courtemanche et al.
2015; Meier and Sprenger 2010). However, one has to
be aware of the assumptions underlying the measure-
ments in these papers, which may have resulted in
the degrees of decreasing impatience to be confounded
with utility curvature and the levels of impatience.
Decreasing impatience refers to a change in the percep-
tion of a delay when the temporal distance to this delay
is changed. Hence, it isolates the inconsistent compo-
nent of pure time preference. Time-inconsistent behav-
ior, however, need not only be driven by pure time pref-
erence. Changes in the valuations of outcomes can also
induce time-inconsistent behavior (Gerber and Rohde
2010, 2015). Such changes may result from the mere
passage of time or from the resolution of uncertainty
concerning valuations.
The role of changes in the valuations of outcomes
as a driver of time inconsistency is supported by
our results concerning the monetary discount factors.
These discount factors show more correlations with
our demographic and behavioral variables. Monetary
discount factors indeed do not only reflect the change
in impatience, but also the level of impatience and the
(linear) utility of outcomes. The extent to which each
of these components contributes to time-inconsistent
behavior remains an open question.
Taken together, the findings of the experiments
in this paper suggest that the theoretical association
between deviations from constant impatience and self-
control problems in daily life is empirically hard to
justify. More research needs to be done to empiri-
cally assess this association. Several avenues for fur-
ther research can be identified. One will have to assess
empirically whether there is a difference between
procedures T and P as discussed in Section 5. It
will also be important to measure the DI-index in
nonmonetary domains. One could imagine that the
DI-index is context dependent and only predicts self-
control problems in daily life when measured using
the same outcome domain as the self-control prob-
lems. Bleichrodt et al. (2016), for instance, show that
deviations from constant impatience are more pro-
nounced for health than for money. More heteroge-
neous subject populations, being more representative
of the general population, may be considered as well
in future studies. Interestingly, Ebert and Prelec (2007),
Malkoc and Zauberman (2006), and Zauberman et al.
(2009) found that the degree of decreasing impatience
is susceptible to manipulation. Future studies should
also assess the sensitivity to manipulation.
8. Conclusion
This paper introduced the DI-index as a measure of
decreasing impatience. The DI-index is model free as
it can be obtained for all individuals, irrespective of
the model that represents their preferences. It isolates
a component of pure time preference that can generate
time inconsistencies. In the discounted utility model,
it captures the change in discounting independently
from the level of discounting. The DI-index can not
only be used for decreasing impatience, but also for
increasing impatience. Decreasing impatience corre-
sponds to positive values of the DI-index, with larger
values corresponding to more decreasing impatience.
Increasing impatience corresponds to negative values
of the DI-index, with lower values corresponding to
more increasing (i.e., less decreasing) impatience. The
DI-index can also be used as a tool to test discounted
utility models.
An experiment illustrated how the DI-index can be
obtained in practice. It requires only two indifferences.
The results of the experiment show that, for our sub-
jects, increasing impatience is almost as prevalent as
decreasing impatience. The DI-index was not corre-
lated with demographic and self-reported time incon-
sistency and self-control variables. We conclude that
self-control problems cannot solely be attributed to
changes in impatience.
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Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1. Consider outcome y / 0, time points
s < t, and delay τ ≥ 0. Assume that y  0. Then, (s , 0) ≺ (t , y) ≺
(s , y). It follows that there must be a x with y  x  0 and
(s , x) ∼ (t , y). We have (t + τ, x) ≺ (t + τ, y) ≺ (t , y) ∼ (s , x).
Therefore, there must be a σ with (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y). Thus,
an indifference pair exists and DI(y , s , t , τ) is well defined.
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We have decreasing impatience if and only if τ ≥ σ, if and
only if DI(y , s , t , τ) ≥ 0.
Assume instead that y ≺ 0. Then, (s , 0)  (t , y)  (s , y).
Therefore, there must be a x with y ≺ x ≺ 0 and (s , x) ∼
(t , y). We have (t + τ, x)  (t + τ, y)  (t , y) ∼ (s , x). There-
fore, there must again be a σ with (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y) such
that an indifference pair exists. Here, we also have decreas-
ing impatience if and only if τ ≥ σ, if and only if DI(y , s , t , τ)
≥ 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let <∗ exhibit more decreasing impa-
tience than <. Consider outcomes y / 0 and y∗ / 0, time
points s < t, and delay τ ≥ 0. Then, we can determine x∗ , x , σ∗,
and σ such that
(s , x∗) ∼∗ (t , y∗), (s + σ∗ , x∗) ∼∗ (t + τ, y∗),
(s , x) ∼ (t , y), and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y).
Now, we can consider two cases. First, assume that 0 4
x∗ 4 y∗. Then, by the definition of comparative decreasing
impatience, we have (s + σ, x∗) 4∗ (t + τ, y∗), which implies
that σ ≥ σ∗. Second, assume that y∗ 4 x∗ 4 0. Then, we have
(s + σ, x∗) <∗ (t + τ, y∗), which also implies that σ ≥ σ∗. It fol-
lows that DI∗(y∗ , s , t , τ) ≥ DI(y , s , t , τ), which concludes the
first part of the proof.
Now, assume that DI∗(y∗ , s , t , τ) ≥ DI(y , s , t , τ) for all out-
comes y / 0 and y∗ / 0, all time points s < t, and all delays
τ ≥ 0. Consider outcomes x / y and x∗ / y∗, time points s < t,
and delays σ ≥ 0 and σ∗ ≥ 0 such that
(s , x∗) ∼∗ (t , y∗), (s + σ∗ , x∗) ∼∗ (t + τ, y∗),
(s , x) ∼ (t , y), and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y).
We must have σ ≥ σ∗, as DI∗(y∗ , s , t , τ) ≥ DI(y , s , t , τ). It fol-
lows that (s + σ, x∗) 4∗ (t + τ, y∗) if 0 4 x∗ 4 y∗. Similarly,
(s + σ, x∗) <∗ (t + τ, y∗) if y∗ 4 x∗ 4 0. Thus, <∗ exhibits more
decreasing impatience than <. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider the following indifference
pair with x , y / 0, s < t, and σ > 0:
(s , x) ∼ (t , y), (A.1)
(s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y). (A.2)
Define, for  small enough so that s +  ∈ T,
h() δ(s + )
δ(s) .
It follows that
h′() δ
′(s + )
δ(s) .
Similarly, for  small enough so that t +  ∈ T, define
k() δ(t + )
δ(t) .
It follows that
k′() δ
′(t + )
δ(t) .
By taking a Taylor series approximation of h and k around
zero, we know that h(σ) and k(τ) can be approximated by
h(σ) ≈ h(0)+ h′(0)σ
and
k(τ) ≈ k(0)+ k′(0)τ.
From the indifferences (A.1) and (A.2), it follows that h(σ) 
k(τ). It follows that τ can be approximated by
τ ≈ h(0) − k(0)+ h
′(0)σ
k′(0) .
It follows that
τ ≈ δ
′(s)
δ(s)
δ(t)
δ′(t)σ.
Thus,
τ− σ ≈ δ
′(s)/δ(s) − δ′(t)/δ(t)
δ′(t)/δ(t) σ.
Rewriting this yields
τ− σ
σ
≈ δ
′(s)/δ(s) − δ′(t)/δ(t)
δ′(t)/δ(t) 
[ln(δ(s))]′ − [ln(δ(t))]′
[ln(δ(t))]′ .
For s close to t, i.e., x close to y, we have
[ln(δ(s))]′ ≈ [ln(δ(t))]′ + [ln(δ(t))]′′(s − t).
It follows that
τ− σ
σ
≈ [ln(δ(t))]
′′(s − t)
[ln(δ(t))]′ .
Thus,
τ− σ
σ(t − s) ≈ −
[ln(δ(t))]′′
[ln(δ(t))]′  P(t).
The result follows. Note that for x close enough to y, we
can always find a t and a τ such that the indifference pair
as in (A.1) and (A.2) exists—i.e., DI(x , y , s , σ) is well de-
fined. Q.E.D.
The proofs of the remaining theorems in the paper all rely
on the following theorem.
Theorem 10. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) Discounted utility holds.
(ii) For all x , y / 0, s < t and σ > 0 with
(s , x) ∼ (t , y), (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y), and
(s , x¯) ∼ (t , y¯), we have (s + σ, x¯) ∼ (t + τ, y¯).
Condition (ii) of Theorem 10 is a Reidemeister condition
(Krantz et al. 1971). Yet, the proof does not follow immedi-
ately from the Reidemeister condition. The proof first obtains
separate additive representations for gains and for losses,
and then needs to show that the discount functions are the
same for gains and for losses.
Proof of Theorem 10. We first prove that (i) implies (ii). As-
sume that (s , x) ∼ (t , y) and (s , x¯) ∼ (t , y¯). Discounted utility
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then implies that u(x)/u(y)  u(x¯)/u( y¯). Consider σ > 0 and
corresponding τ such that (s+σ, x) ∼ (t+τ, y). Then, we have
δ(t + τ)
δ(s + σ) 
u(x)
u(y) 
u(x¯)
u( y¯) ,
which implies that (s + σ, x¯) ∼ (t + τ, y¯).
Now, we prove that (ii) implies (i). Consider s , t , l ∈ T and
x , y , z ∈X. Let (t , x) ∼ (s , y), (l , x) ∼ (t , y) and (t , y) ∼ (s , z).
Case 1. Let x ∼ 0. Then, it follows from monotonicity that
we must have y ∼ 0 and z ∼ 0. It follows that (l , y) ∼ (t , z).
Case 2. Let x / 0 and s < t. It follows from (ii) that (l , y) ∼
(t , z).
Case 3. Let x / 0 and s > t. Impatience and monotonic-
ity then imply that t > l. Moreover, we either have 0  x 
y  z or 0 ≺ x ≺ y ≺ z. Suppose that we have (l , y) / (t , z).
Then, by continuity, theremust be an outcome wwith (l ,w) ∼
(t , z) and w / y or (l , y)∼ (t ,w) and w / z. This can be proven
as follows. Consider the case with 0  x  y  z and (l , y) ≺
(t , z). We have (t , z) ≺ (t , y) ∼ (l , x). So, there must be a w
with (l ,w) ∼ (t , z). The other cases can be proven in a similar
manner.
Then, (ii) implies that (t ,w) ∼ (s , z) or (t , y) ∼ (s ,w), con-
tradicting (t , y) ∼ (s , z). Thus, we must have that (l , y) ∼ (t , z).
It follows that the hexagon condition (Wakker 1989) holds.
Suppose we consider only gains—i.e., outcomes better
than zero. Then, by Wakker (1989, theorem III 4.1), prefer-
ences can be represented by V(t , x)  f +(t)+ g+(x), as his CI
condition is implied by impatience and monotonicity. Simi-
larly, for losses, preferences can be represented by V(t , x) 
f −(t)+ g−(x).
The function f +(t)must be decreasing in t and g+(x)must
be increasing in x—i.e., for y  x, wemust have g+(y)> g+(x).
Moreover, for x approaching zero, we have that g+(x) goes to
minus infinity, which can be proven as follows.
Suppose that for x approaching 0, we would have that
g+(x) has as its limit a number m ∈. Now, consider a time t
and an outcome ε  0 that is arbitrarily close to zero. Then,
(0, ε)  (t , ε)  (t , 0) ∼ (0, 0). By continuity, it follows that
there must be an outcome κ  0 with (t , ε) ∼ (0, κ). More-
over, κ is also very close to zero. Then, we have (t , ε) 
(1/n , κ) for all n > 0. Thus, we have f +(t)+ g+(ε) > f +(1/n)+
g+(κ) for all n > 0. Yet, as κ and ε are arbitrarily close to
zero, we have g+(ε) arbitrarily close to g+(κ). Thus, f +(t) −
f +(1/n) > g+(κ) − g+(ε) ≈ 0. This contradicts the fact that
f +(t)− f +(1/n) < 0 for n large enough. Thus, for x approach-
ing zero, we must have that g+(x) goes to minus infinity.
Similarly, for x approaching zero, we have that g−(x) goes
to infinity. We have that f −(t) is increasing in t and g−(x)
is increasing in x. Suppose that g−(x) would have m as its
limit as x approaches zero. Consider time t and an outcome
ε ≺ 0 that is arbitrarily close to zero. We have (0, ε) ≺ (t , ε) ≺
(t , 0) ∼ (0, 0). By continuity, it follows that there must be an
outcome κ with (t , ε) ∼ (0, κ). Moreover, κ is also very close
to zero. Then, we have (t , ε) ≺ (1/n , κ) for all n > 0. Thus,
we have f −(t)+ g−(ε) < f −(1/n)+ g−(κ) for all n > 0. Yet, as
κ and ε are arbitrarily close to zero, we have g−(ε) arbitrar-
ily close to g−(κ). Thus, f −(t) − f −(1/n) < g−(κ) − g−(ε) ≈ 0.
This contradicts the fact that f −(t) − f −(1/n) > 0 for n large
enough. Thus, for x approaching zero, we have that g−(x)
goes to infinity.
We can equally well represent preferences over timed
gains by e f +(t)e g+(x). Similarly, we can represent preferences
over timed losses by e f −(t)e g−(x) and even by e− f −(t)×(−e−g−(x)).
We set u(x)  e g+(x) for x > 0 and u(x)  −e−g−(x) for x < 0.
It follows that u(x) approaches zero as x approaches zero.
Thus, we can set u(x)  0. If we then also set δ+(t)  e f +(t)
and δ−(t) e f −(t), thenwe have that δ+(t)u(x) represents pref-
erences over timed outcomes with outcomes being weakly
preferred to zero, and δ−(t)u(x) represents preferences over
timed outcomes with outcomes being weakly worse than
zero. It follows that we have discounted utility with a con-
tinuous utility function and a discount function that may be
different for gains (δ+( · )) than for losses (δ−( · )). It remains to
be proven that the discount function for gains must be equal
to the discount function for losses.
We are free to set δ+(
¯
t)  δ−(
¯
t). Moreover, if δ−( · )u( · )
represents preferences over timed losses, then for all a > 0,
we have that (δ−( · ))a(u( · ))a represents the same preferences.
Thus, we are also free to set δ+(s) δ−(s) for some s ∈ T with
s >
¯
t.
Consider outcomes x+ and y+ and a σ with (
¯
t , x+) ∼ (
¯
t +
σ, y+) and (
¯
t + σ, x+) ∼ (s , y+). Consider x− and y− with
(
¯
t , x−) ∼ (
¯
t + σ, y−). According to (ii), we must then also have
(
¯
t + σ, x−) ∼ (s , y−). As δ+(
¯
t)  δ−(
¯
t) and δ+(s)  δ−(s), it fol-
lows that δ+(
¯
t + σ)  δ−(
¯
t + σ). By continuing in this manner,
we can show that δ+(t)  δ−(t) for all t between
¯
t and s. By
considering outcomes x+ and y+ and a σ with (s − σ, x+) ∼
(s , y+) and (s , x+) ∼ (s+τ, y+), we can prove, in a similar man-
ner, that δ+(t) δ−(t) also for t larger than s. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 6. We first prove that (i) implies (ii). As-
sume that (s , x) ∼ (t , y) and s+σ, t+σ ∈T. Constant discount-
ing implies that (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + σ, y). It follows that DI 0.
Now, we prove that that (ii) implies (i). From (ii) and The-
orem 10, it follows that discounted utility holds. It remains
to be proven that constant discounting holds. This follows
from the proof of Theorem 8 in Rohde (2010) as the solu-
tion to Cauchy’s functional equation also holds if T does not
equal +. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 7. We first prove that (i) implies (ii).
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting implies constant impatience if
time 0 is not involved, which shows statement (a). Assume
that (0, x) ∼ (t , y) and (σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y). Then, we have u(x) 
βδtu(y) and βδσu(x)  βδt+τu(y). It follows that δσu(x) 
δt+τu(y), which implies βδt+σu(y)  δt+τu(y), so βδσ  δτ .
Thus, τ− σ  ln(β)/ln(δ).
Now, we prove that that (ii) implies (i). From (ii) and The-
orem 10, it follows that discounted utility holds. It remains
to be proven that quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds. This
follows from Theorem 10 in Rohde (2010) as the solution to
Cauchy’s functional equation also holds on T. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 8. We first prove that (i) implies (ii). As-
sume that (s , x) ∼ (t , y) and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y). This implies
δ(s)
δ(t) 
δ(s + σ)
δ(t + τ) .
Wewill now address each of the cases in (ii). Two-stage expo-
nential discounting implies constant impatience, i.e., DI  0,
if s , t , s + σ, t + τ > λ or s , t , s + σ, t + τ < λ. Now, assume that
s < λ < t , s + σ, t + τ. Then, we have
αs
(α/β)λβt 
(α/β)λβs+σ
(α/β)λβt+τ .
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It follows that
αs
(α/β)λβt 
βs+σ
βt+τ
.
Thus,
αs−λ
βt−λ
 βs+σ−t−τ ,
which implies
(s − λ) lnα  (s − λ+ σ− τ) ln β,
so
τ− σ  (λ− s) ln(α/β)
ln(β) ,
which implies DI ((λ− s)/(σ(t − s)))(ln(α/β)/ln(β)).
Now, assume that s , s + σ < λ < t , t + τ. Then, we have
αs
(α/β)λβt 
αs+σ
(α/β)λβt+τ .
It follows that ασ  βτ , so that τ − σ  σ(ln(α/β)/ln(β))—
i.e., DI (1/(t − s))(ln(α/β)/ln(β)).
Now, assume that s , t < λ < s + σ, t + τ. It follows that
αs
αt

βs+σ
βt+τ
,
which implies (t − s) ln(α) (t − s + τ− σ) ln(β), so that
τ− σ  (t − s) ln(α/β)
ln(β) .
It follows that DI (1/σ)(ln(α/β)/ln(β)).
Finally, assume that s , t , s + σ < λ < t + τ. It follows that
αs
αt

αs+σ
(α/β)λβt+τ 
αs+σ−λ
βt+τ−λ
,
which implies (λ− t − σ) ln(α) (λ− t − τ) ln(β). Thus,
τ− σ  (t + σ− λ) ln(α/β)
ln(β) .
It follows that DI ((t + σ− λ)/(σ(t − s)))(ln(α/β)/ln(β)).
The proof that (ii) implies (i) follows from Pan et al. (2015,
Theorem 3.2.1). Their midpoint consistency is implied by our
last line of (ii), and their two-stage stationarity is implied
by (ii)(a). Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 9. We first prove that (i) implies (ii). As-
sume that (s , x) ∼ (t , y) and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y). Then, we
have
δ(s)
δ(t) 
δ(s + σ)
δ(t + τ) .
It follows that
1+ αs
1+ αt 
1+ α(s + σ)
1+ α(t + τ) .
Thus, τ(1+ αs) σ(1+ αt). It follows that
DI τ− σ
σ(t − s) 
σ((1+ αt)/(1+ αs)) − σ
σ(t − s)

(
1+ αt
1+ αs − 1
)
1
t − s

1+ αt − 1− αs
(1+ αs)(t − s) 
α
1+ αs .
Now, we prove that (ii) implies (i). From (ii) and Theo-
rem 10, it follows that discounted utility holds. It remains
to be proven that generalized hyperbolic discounting holds.
This follows from Rohde (2010, Theorem 9). Q.E.D.
For CADI and CRDI discounting, we have the following
theorems.
Theorem 11. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) CADI discounted utility holds.
(ii) For all x , y / 0, s < t, σ > 0, and all κ with
(s , x) ∼ (t , y), (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y), and
(s + κ, x¯) ∼ (t + κ, y¯), we have (s + κ+ σ, x¯) ∼ (t + κ+ τ, y¯).
In this theorem, constant decreasing impatience is re-
flected by the fact that adding a constant κ to s and t does
not change the degree of decreasing impatience DI.
Proof of Theorem 11. We first prove that (i) implies (ii).
Assume that (s , x) ∼ (t , y) and (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y) and
(s + κ, x¯) ∼ (t + κ, y¯). Then,
δ(s)
δ(t) 
δ(s + σ)
δ(t + τ) .
From CADI discounting, it follows that
δ(s + κ)
δ(t + κ) 
δ(s + σ+ κ)
δ(t + τ+ κ) .
Therefore, (s + σ+ κ, x¯) ∼ (t + τ+ κ, y¯). The result follows.
The proof that (ii) implies (i) follows from the fact that (ii)
implies discounted utility and from Bleichrodt et al. (2009,
Theorem 5.3). Q.E.D.
Theorem 12. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) CRDI discounted utility holds.
(ii) For all x , y / 0, s < t and κ, σ > 0 with
(s , x) ∼ (t , y), (s + σ, x) ∼ (t + τ, y) and
(κs , x¯) ∼ (κt , y¯), we have (κ(s + σ), x¯) ∼ (κ(t + τ), y¯).
Proof of Theorem 12. The proof of this theorem follows
from a similar argument as the proof of Theorem 11 and
Theorem 6.3 in Bleichrodt et al. (2009). Q.E.D.
Appendix B
Table B.1. Self-Awareness Questions
Variable Statement
convenient Whether something is convenient for me or not,
to a large extent determines the decisions
that I take or the actions that I undertake.
sportswish I wish I would do sports more often than
I do currently.
sportsshould I should do sports more often than I do currently.
study I study regularly.
studywish I wish I would study more regularly.
studyshould I should study more regularly.
prep I am always well-prepared in class.
prepwish I wish I would be better prepared in class.
prepshould I should be better prepared in class.
postpone I have a tendency to postpone tasks.
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Table B.2. Summary Statistics of Demographic and Behavioral Variables
Variable Mean
gender 74.8% male
age 19.4
sports (no. of hours per week) 4.9
smoke 2.7 (1=every now and then, 2=every day, 3=no)
days of alcohol 1.3
glasses of alcohol 3.5
bmi 21.9
does not live with parents 45.8%
save (yes/no) 77.6%
monthly savings e64.9
savingsaccount 3.2 (3 between e500 and e1,000 and 4more than e1,000)
sportswish 5.5∗∗∗
sportsshould 4.6
study 5.3∗∗∗
studywish 5.7∗∗∗
studyshould 5.4∗∗∗
prep 4.2
prepwish 5.5∗∗∗
prepshould 5.4∗∗∗
convenient 5.6∗∗∗
postpone 5.2∗∗∗
EIgap 0.7
∗∗∗The response to the variable deviates significantly (p < 0.01) from 4.5 according to a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test.
The response to the variable deviates significantly (p < 0.01) from zero according to a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test.
Table B.3. Spearman Rank Correlations Between Behavioral Variables
sports sportswish sportshould study studywish studyshould prep prepwish prepshould convenient postpone
sports ·
sportswish −0.46∗∗∗
[107]
(0.0000)
sportsshould −0.56∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
[107] [107]
(0.0000) (0.0000)
study −0.25∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.11
[107] [107] [107]
(0.0095) (0.0066) (0.2508)
studywish 0.14 0.10 0.13 −0.42∗∗∗
[107] [107] [107] [107]
(0.1483) (0.3025) (0.1844) (0.0000)
studyshould 0.11 0.06 0.15 −0.56∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
[107] [107] [107] [107] [107]
(0.2478) (0.5491) (0.1112) (0.0000) (0.0000)
prep −0.08 0.11 0.06 0.66∗∗∗ −0.34∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗
[107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107]
(0.3846) (0.2584) (0.5631) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0000)
prepwish 0.02 0.27∗∗∗ 0.18 −0.18 0.56∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗
[107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107]
(0.8765) (0.0046) (0.0616) (0.0630) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0075)
prepshould −0.05 0.22∗∗ 0.25∗∗ −0.36∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗
[107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107]
(0.6247) (0.0248) (0.0101) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
convenient 0.05 0.06 0.02 −0.11 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.17
[106] [106] [106] [106] [106] [106] [106] [106] [106]
(0.6305) (0.5566) (0.8015) (0.2497) (0.9802) (0.3471) (0.5583) (0.2546) (0.0893)
postpone −0.02 0.03 0.13 −0.41∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ −0.35∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
[107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [107] [106]
(0.8509) (0.7516) (0.1832) (0.0000) (0.0100) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0001)
EIgap −0.05 0.16 0.17 −0.05 0.21∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ −0.16 0.20∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.04 0.18
[101] [101] [101] [101] [101] [101] [101] [101] [101] [100] [101]
(0.6183) (0.1016) (0.0900) (0.6515) (0.0388) (0.0088) (0.1133) (0.0472) (0.0358) (0.6750) (0.0645)
Note. The number of observations are in square brackets and the p-values are in parentheses.
∗∗∗ and ∗∗ denote a significant deviation from 0 with p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively.
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Endnotes
1All results in this paper remain valid if X is a connected topological
space.
2We assume that <∗ and < are defined over the same set of timed
outcomes. Moreover, <∗ is a continuous weak order with zero as a
neutral outcome, and <∗ and < order outcomes in the same way—
i.e., x <∗ y if and only if x < y.
3The order in which the limits are taken does not affect the results.
4An index of decreasing impatience should be increasing in τ − σ,
which the hyperbolic factor need not be when tσ− sτ < 0.
5 In a similar spirit, Benoît and Ok (2007) showed that discount
factors cannot always be used to meaningfully compare people’s
degrees of (im)patience.
6The temptation-ideal gap was not computed as quite a few sub-
jects appeared not to understand the difference between questions c
and d.
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